Abstract. Over the last decade we have witnessed the rapid proliferation of online networks and Internet activity. Such activity is considered as a blessing but it brings with it a large increase in risk of computer malware -malignant software that actively spreads from one computer to another. To date, the majority of existing models of malware spread use stochastic behavior, when the set of neighbors infected from the current set of infected nodes is chosen obliviously. In this work, we initiate the study of adversarial infection strategies which can decide intelligently which neighbors of infected nodes to infect next in order to maximize their spread, while maintaining a similar "signature" as the oblivious stochastic infection strategy as not to be discovered. We first establish that computing an optimal and near-optimal adversarial strategies is computationally hard. We then identify necessary and sufficient conditions in terms of network structure and edge infection probabilities such that the adversarial process can infect polynomially more nodes than the stochastic process while maintaining a similar "signature" as the oblivious stochastic infection strategy. Among our results is a surprising connection between an additional structural quantity of interest in a network, the network toughness, and adversarial infections. Based on the network toughness, we characterize networks where existence of adversarial strategies that are pandemic (infect all nodes) is guaranteed, as well as efficiently computable.
Introduction
Over the last decade we have witnessed the rapid proliferation of online networks and Internet activity. While such a proliferation is considered by many as a blessing, it brings with it an increase in risk of computer malware -malignant software that actively spreads from one computer to another. Indeed, a long thread of research has been devoted to understanding the spread of malicious malware such as computer viruses, computer worms and other malignant forms of computer infection cf. [3, 16, 17, 19, 21] . However, such work has, so far, On the Power of Adversarial Infections in Networks only considered oblivious malware propagation, where the spreading malware does not behave strategically in its choice of which nodes to spread to. What now is a standard way of containing the spread of malware is the control of the amount of information that spreads from one computer to others [3, 19] . This is also known as throttling. Under rate control, a malware that does not want to get detected spreads obliviously to a small set of neighbors while abiding by the rate constraint. Inspired by this fact, in this work we initiate the study of intelligent malware propagation, where the spreading malware can strategically decide which neighboring nodes to infect under rate constraints, in order to maximize the total number of infections over time. Each edge (u, v) is equipped with an edge weight p (u, v) representing the amount of a typical and normal communication between the two nodes u and v. Typical examples of such networks include email networks, instant messaging networks, and online social networks, among others. Under the rate constraint, a malware spreading from an infected node u can infect at most a number of nodes that is not more than the typical "signature" of communication, namely, ⎡
More generally, we will demand that for any subset X, the malware must not infect more nodes than the amount of traffic involving X permits it to, namely, ⎡
In particular, such malware can use the structure of the network in order to choose which of the neighboring computers to infect from a newly infected node. We initiate a detailed comparison of the behavior of an adversarial infection, that can use the network structure, to that of an oblivious stochastic one, that spreads according to the standard Independent Cascades diffusion model. In order to defend against future malware it is of primary importance to first analyse the adversarial infections strategy and to contrast its behavior with that of the oblivious stochastic strategy.
We would like to further emphasize the need to understand the behavior of adversarial infections with the following example, comparing the behavior of a well-planned adversarial infection to that of a simple heuristic. Consider a path connected at one of its ends to the root of a two level binary tree. Set all edge weights to 1/2. A greedy strategy may consist, for each newly infected node u, to infect its r u neighbors of highest degree, where r u is the rate constraint of u. However, such a strategy would miss the path altogether. In contrast, an adversary with a global knowledge of the graph can plan ahead and infect the whole path, by starting from the root of the tree but spending its budget to infect the next node on the path (and the extra budget to infect part of tree). While greedy would infect only O(1) nodes, a well-planned adversary would infect n − O(1) nodes.
